PHILIPP
KREMERS

PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS

1) 2024: »Natural Theology and Divine Freedom,« Sophia 63 (1), pp. 135‐150 [DOI: 10.1007/s11841-023-00951-6 | Penultimate Draft].

Abstract: Many philosophers of theistic religions claim (1) that there are powerful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence that make it rational to believe that He exists and at the same time maintain (2) that God always has the freedom to do otherwise. In this article, I argue that these two positions are inconsistent because the empirical evidence on which the a posteriori arguments for God’s existence rest can be explained better by positing the existence of a God-like being without the freedom to do otherwise.

2) 2022: »Maitzen’s Objection from God’s Goodness,« Sophia 61 (3), pp. 581‐598 [DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00861-5 | Penultimate Draft].

Abstract: Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence »God is (morally) good« is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams’ version of divine command metaethics is not committed to accept this assumption. I conclude that Maitzen’s objection merely manages to refute a strawman version of divine command metaethics.

3) 2021: »What If God Commanded Something Horrible? A Pragmatics-Based Defence of Divine Command Metaethics,« Religious Studies 57 (4), pp. 597‐617 [DOI: 10.1017/S0034412519000684 | Penultimate Draft].

Abstract: The objection of horrible commands claims that divine command metaethics is doomed to failure because it is committed to the extremely counterintuitive assumption that torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be morally obligatory if God commanded these acts. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that formulating this objection in terms of counterpossibles is particularly forceful because it cannot be simply evaded by insisting on God’s necessary perfect moral goodness. I show that divine command metaethics can be defended even against this counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands because we can explain the truth-value intuitions about the disputed counterpossibles as the result of conversational implicatures. Furthermore, I show that this pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics has several advantages over Pruss’s reductio counterargument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands.